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INTRODUCTION 
This case arises from the dismissal of a Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce 
and the denial of preliminary injunctive relief.  About 13 months after Michael Stevens 
(“Ex-Husband”) and Mary Ellen Robertson (“Ex-Wife”) were divorced, Ex-Husband 
sought relief from the divorce court to prospectively enjoin the speech of Ex-Wife on a 
preliminary and permanent basis, alleging that her speech was defamatory and an 
invasion of his privacy.  Ex-Wife opposed Ex-Husband’s motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief and moved to dismiss his Petition to Modify under Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  The district court denied Ex-Husband’s request for preliminary injunctive relief 
and granted the Motion to Dismiss.  The district court reasoned that (1) the request for 
preliminary injunctive relief should be denied on the merits because Ex-Husband made 
no showing of a threat of immediate and irreparable harm; (2) both the motion and the 
Petition to Modify addressed what amounted to tort claims that could not be litigated 
within the parties’ divorce case;1 and (3) the Petition to Modify failed to allege a 
substantial and material change in circumstances.  This appeal followed.     
While the district court properly denied the motion and dismissed Petition to 
Modify, there was one additional reason that the district court failed to rule upon that 
supports its conclusions—that granting Ex-Husband’s requested relief would amount to 
an unconstitutional prior restraint on Ex-Wife’s speech.  As detailed below, the district 
court’s order should be affirmed on this alternative basis.      
                                               
1 Ex-Husband filed a separate civil action against Ex-Wife for defamation and 
invasion of privacy, which is pending in Second District Court, Civil No. 170902157. 
 5 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
With respect to the dismissal of the petition to modify, the standard of review is de 
novo.  Rawcliffe v. Anciaux, 2017 UT 72, ¶ 8.  With respect to the denial of preliminary 
injunctive relief, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.  Zagg, Inc. v. Harmer, 
2015 UT App 52, ¶ 4.   
II. PRESERVATION 
All issues and arguments set forth in this brief were addressed in multiple rounds 
of briefing at the district court level and (See, e.g., April 5, 2017 Hearing Tr. 17:3 - 
21:21.)    
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Ex-Husband and Ex-Wife were divorced by the Utah Second District Court on 
November 10, 2015, via stipulation.  (See November 10, 2015 Decree of Divorce.) 
2. There were no children of the marriage.  (Id. ¶ 5.) 
3. In connection with the divorce, the parties specifically negotiated the scope of a 
non-disparagement clause.  In that regard, the Decree of Divorce, at paragraph 22, states, “Non-
disparagement.  Mary Ellen shall not tell third parties that (1) Michael kicked her out of the 
house, or (2) Michael has stolen marital assets.”  (Id. ¶ 22.) 
4. On November 15, 2016, Ex-Husband filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of 
Divorce, alleging that, since entry of the Decree of Divorce, Ex-Wife made statements that were 
defamatory and invaded his privacy.2  Ex-Husband also filed a Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order on the same day.   
5. The Petition to Modify and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
requested broad prospective injunctive relief regarding Ex-Wife’s speech.  For example, the 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order requested that Ex-Wife be enjoined as follows: 
That [Ex-Wife] be restrained from making any statements regarding their 
marriage or divorce or relationship to third parties which could cause [Ex-
Husband] any embarrassment or humiliation or otherwise reflect negatively on the 
[Ex-Husband] or cause the [Ex-Husband] to be held in a false light or in 
disrepute. 
 
That [Ex-Wife] shall not share any legal documents … or any other 
communication arising out of this divorce action, including any specific details 
about the final resolution or actions taken in the course of modifying the divorce 
decree, with any third party except as follows: legal counsel for the parties, 
                                               
2  While Ex-Wife denies that any statements she made are correctly characterized, in 
context, and/or otherwise actionable, given the standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, Ex-Wife does not address those issues in this appeal. 
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immediate family, or when such disclosure is required by a subpoena … . 
 
…[Ex-Wife] shall refrain from making any communication through any medium, 
either orally, nonverbally or in writing … that may be construed as harmful, 
embarrassing, humiliating or otherwise disparaging, or that defames, impugns, 
damages or assails the reputation, casts in a misleading light or causes or tends to 
cause the recipient of a communication to question the integrity, competence, 
good character, professionalism, or reputation of [Ex-Husband’s] immediate 
family members and/or any private third party and/or the employees or board 
members of organizations with which [Ex-Husband] is connected … . 
 
(November 15, 2016 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ¶¶ 1-3.) 
6. The Petition to Modify did not articulate a single change in circumstance.  Rather, 
the Petition to Modify merely set forth the unsupported conclusion that, “there has been 
substantial and material changes in circumstances since the entry of the Decree not contemplated 
in the Decree … .”  (November 15, 2016 Petition to Modify, at 1.) 
II. DISTRICT COURT DISPOSITION 
 On December 6, 2016, the Honorable Commissioner Christina Wilson orally 
recommended that Ex-Husband’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief be denied.    
This recommendation was memorialized via written order entered by the Honorable 
Ernest W. Jones December 20, 2016. 
On March 7, 2017, the Honorable Commissioner Christina Wilson recommended 
that Ex-Wife’s Motion to Dismiss be granted.  This recommendation was memorialized 
via written order entered by the Honorable Ernest W. Jones March 27, 2017. 
On April 28, 2017, the Honorable Ernest W. Jones entered a final order entitled 
“Order on Objections to Recommendation of Commissioner of December 6, 2016, and 
March 7, 2017” in which he ordered that Ex-Husband’s motion for preliminary injunctive 
relief be denied and Ex-Wife’s Motion to Dismiss be granted. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 To the extent Ex-Husband wishes to assert claims against Ex-Wife for any 
statements she has made, Ex-Husband is free to do so, and actually has done so, by filing 
a civil action just as if the speaker was someone to whom he was never married.  See 
supra, footnote 1.  However, Ex-Husband may not prospectively enjoin Ex-Wife’s 
speech through a petition to modify their Decree of Divorce.  While Ex-Husband was not 
asking for money damages, the only basis for his Petition to Modify was that Ex-Wife 
had allegedly defamed him and invaded his privacy.  This alone cannot act as the basis of 
a petition to modify their Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, the district court properly 
determined that Ex-Husband was improperly attempting to litigate tort claims in a 
divorce proceeding and properly dismissed his Petition to Modify.   
Moreover, Ex-Husband had not properly alleged any change in circumstances, let 
alone one that would justify modifying the Decree of Divorce.  The parties already had a 
narrow, non-disparagement provision in their Decree of Divorce, which Ex-Wife had not 
violated.  The parties and the divorce court had therefore contemplated this specific issue 
at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, making it unavailable to serve as a basis to 
modify the Decree of Divorce.   
 Finally, prior restraints on speech such as that requested by Ex-Husband in this case are 
presumptively unconstitutional.  Claims by spouses or ex-spouses seeking prospective injunctive 
relief of adult-to-adult speech have been rejected across the country as unconstitutional.  While 
the district court did not rule on this issue, this Court should affirm the district court’s order on 
the additional basis that Ex-Husband’s requested relief was an unconstitutional prior restraint.   
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION TO 
 MODIFY. 
 
A. The District Court Correctly Concluded that Ex-Husband’s 
 Allegations Sounded in Tort and Dismissed the Petition to Modify. 
 
 1. Divorce Courts do not Retain Jurisdiction Over the Parties Beyond Their  
   Marital Relationship.   
 
When married persons divorce, they become legal strangers but for enforcement of the 
terms of their decree of divorce.  While divorce courts retain jurisdiction over the parties’ 
divorce to enforce or modify the decree, divorce courts do not retain jurisdiction to address every 
dispute between formerly married persons forever.  Any legal claims arising after the divorce, 
particularly those that sound in tort, are addressed in civil courts just as if the parties had never 
married.    
In this regard, Utah law is clear that “[a]ctionable torts between married persons should 
not be litigated in a divorce proceeding.” Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); accord Bayles v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, ¶ 14, 981 P.2d 403; Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 
1369 (Utah 1988).  Utah law is equally clear that a petition to modify a decree of divorce is not a 
proper vehicle to address alleged torts between ex-spouses.  See Masters, 777 P.2d at 503 (“the 
trial court correctly dismissed the fraud claim as being improperly raised in the petition for 
modification of the divorce decree”).   
Here, as in Masters and the other cases cited, Ex-Husband improperly attempted to use a 
tort claim as an entrée to relief in a divorce case.  While he may not have requested a jury trial or 
that the divorce court award him damages, the crux of his allegations was that because Ex-Wife 
had committed a tort, he was entitled to equitable relief from the divorce court.  Ex-Husband has 
never cited any authority for the argument that allegations of torts invoke the equitable powers of 
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the divorce courts and open the door to tort-related injunctive relief in divorce cases.  Indeed, the 
case law holds the opposite.  See id.  As such, his requested relief was properly denied by the 
district court. 
 2. Ex-Husband Takes Bayles Out of Context.    
 
Ex-Husband cites one sentence from Bayles out of context to support his argument that 
divorce courts should be the proper forum for tort cases.  While Bayles does indeed state, 
“divorce courts are free to address” tort claims, the entire context of that statement from Bayles 
is: 
Defendant’s allegations against plaintiff in support of his petition to modify sound 
in tort. Although divorce courts are free to address them, actionable torts between 
married persons should not be litigated in a divorce proceeding. A claim of fraud 
is considered a tort, and thus is not properly addressed in a petition to modify a 
divorce decree. 
 
* * * 
 
We hold that a claim of fraud, in almost every instance, is not properly addressed 
in a petition to modify a divorce decree. 
 
Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, ¶¶ 14, 20.  The Bayles court was not inviting the litigation of tort 
cases within divorce cases, nor was it stating that the allegation of a tort is the basis for 
modification of a domestic order.  Indeed, the Bayles holding is directly the opposite.  See id.   
B. The District Court Correctly Concluded that Ex-Husband’s Petition to 
 Modify Failed to Allege a Proper Change in Circumstances. 
 
 1. Ex-Husband Failed to Articulate Any Change in Circumstances in His  
   Petition to Modify. 
 
“A party requesting that a divorce decree be modified must demonstrate that there has 
been a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree that was not 
contemplated in the decree itself.”  Cantrell v. Cantrell, 2013 UT App 296, ¶ 19, 323 P.3d 586.  
Here, Ex-Husband’s Petition to Modify did not specify a single change in circumstance.  Rather, 
 11 
the Petition to Modify set forth the conclusion that, “there has been substantial and material 
changes in circumstances since the entry of the Decree not contemplated in the Decree,” and then 
followed with his requested relief.  The Petition to Modify was properly dismissed on that basis 
alone.3       
 2. Possible Disparagement was Specifically Contemplated in the Decree of  
   Divorce. 
 
Further, the matter about which Ex-Husband complained—Ex-Wife’s disparagement of 
him—was specifically addressed by the Decree of Divorce at paragraph 22.  Therefore, because 
the disparagement issue was “contemplated in the decree itself,” alleged disparagement cannot 
serve as a change in circumstances to modify the Decree of Divorce.  See Cantrell, 2013 UT App 
296, ¶ 19. 
C. The District Court’s Order Should be Affirmed on the Alternative 
 Ground of Unconstitutional Prior Restraint. 
 
The United States Constitution and Utah Constitution both protect the free speech rights 
of their citizens.  U.S. Const. Amend. I; Utah Const. Art. I, Sect. 1.  As to the Utah Constitution 
specifically, Article I, Section 1 protects citizens’ free speech rights even more broadly than the 
United States Constitution, protecting “the inherent and inalienable right” of citizens to “to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions.”  Moreover, both in Utah and under federal law, 
prior restraints on speech are presumptively unconstitutional.  Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 
2003 UT 26, ¶ 14, 73 P.3d 334, 339 (“any system of prior restraint [on speech] comes to the 
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity”) (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. 
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225 (1990)). 
                                               
3  The district court was not required to allow Ex-Husband leave to amend.  Even 
assuming review of leave to amend was preserved for appellate review, the district court 
properly concluded that amendment would be futile.    
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 In the context of divorce, state appellate courts across the country have rejected similar 
claims by spouses or ex-spouses seeking injunctive relief as to adult-to-adult speech.  See, e.g., 
In re Marriage of Candiotti, 34 Cal. App. 4th 718, 726 (Cal. 1995) (prior restraint on ex-
spouse’s speech unconstitutional even if remarks are rude, unkind, motivated by hostility, or 
even libelous) (emphasis added); Wutzel-Frez v. Frez, 2015 WL 6557830, at *8 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 1, 2015) (“a broad order limiting the defendant’s speech online is an impermissible prior 
restraint on speech”); In re Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 536 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) 
(restriction of father’s free speech rights by divorce court unconstitutional); In re Marriage of 
Meredith, 201 P.3d 1056, 1062 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (prior restraint on speech in divorce case 
unconstitutional).  These cases recognize that although divorce courts may restrain speech to 
children to further the best interests of those children, “impinging on a parent’s right to speak 
about another adult, outside the presence of the children … constitutes undue prior restraint of 
speech.”  See In re Marriage of Candiotti, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 725.  
 Although any private party has the right to seek redress from the courts if he is the victim 
of a tort by filing an action at law, requesting a broad and vague prior restraint of speech from a 
divorce court is a vastly different and more problematic request.  Ex-husband’s position before 
the district court cannot survive the strict scrutiny of the United States and Utah constitutions.  
Any interest he may have in being free from tortious activity can be (and must be) addressed in a 
separate civil action.  Thus, while the district court was correct in dismissing his petition and 
denying his motion for injunctive relief, it could have and should have determined that the 
requested relief would have amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint.    
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
 Ultimately, denial of injunctive relief was proper because the Petition to Modify 
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was properly dismissed.  For all the reasons supporting dismissal of the Petition to 
Modify, including that any injunction would be unconstitutional, denial of injunctive 
relief was also proper because Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(4) requires that there be “a 
substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, 
or the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further 
litigation.”  Where a party does not have valid claims for relief in an underlying pleading, 
preliminary relief necessarily fails as a matter of law.   
 Further, the district court also did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ex-
Husband had failed to demonstrate a threat of immediate and irreparable harm warranting 
injunctive relief.  Ex-Husband had provided little more than conclusory allegations of fears of 
harm.  The district court was within its discretion to determine that Ex-Husband’s claims of harm 
were merely speculative and that the high standard of a threat of immediate and irreparable 
harm had not been met.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court should be affirmed.   
Dated this 9th day of March, 2018. 
 LIEBERMAN SIEBERS, LLC 
By:  
 [Electronically Signed]                                                    
 Ben W. Lieberman 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT






ORDER ON OBJECTIONS TO
RECOMMENDATIONS OF
COMMISSIONER OF 
DECEMBER 6, 2016, 
AND MARCH 7, 2017
Civil No.          154901439
Judge              Jones
Commissioner Wilson
This matter comes before the Court upon the objections by both Petitioner Mary Ellen 
Robertson (“Petitioner”) and Respondent Michael Stevens (“Respondent”) to two 
recommendations of The Honorable Christina L. Wilson, one recommendation orally made on 
December 6, 2016 (the “December 6, 2016 Recommendation”), which was memorialized in a 
written order entered December 20, 2016, and the other recommendation orally made on March 
7, 2017 (the “March 7, 2017 Recommendation”), which was memorialized in a written order 
The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: April 28, 2017 /s/ Ernie W. Jones
10:34:02 AM District Court Judge
April 28, 2017 10:34 AM 1 of 4
entered March 27, 2017.  Oral argument on all objections was held on April 5, 2017, before this 
Court, with both parties present and represented by counsel.  Based upon the submissions of the 
parties and the arguments of counsel at the hearing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Respondent’s objection as to the December 6, 2016 Recommendation address the 
denial of Respondent’s request for preliminary injunctive relief.   The Court overrules the 
objection and finds the request for preliminary injunctive relief was properly denied.  The Court 
finds that divorcing parties often say disparaging things about each other before, during and after
the divorce.  Unless a party can show immediate and irreparable harm, a temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction cannot be maintained.  The Court finds there is no evidence that 
Respondent lost his job or that there was a reduction in his income.  It is not enough to allege 
that the actions of Petitioner are damaging Respondent’s reputation unless there is some real 
harm.  The Court finds that Commissioner Wilson did not abuse her discretion in dissolving the 
temporary restraining order and denying Respondent’s request for preliminary injunctive relief.  
The Court finds that the divorce case is not the right forum to litigate what amounts to 
allegations of a tort action.  
2. The Court overrules Petitioner’s objection as to the December 6, 2016 
Recommendation as moot.  
3. Respondent’s objection as to the March 7, 2017 Recommendation addresses 
Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss.  Commissioner Wilson recommended that Petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss be granted on the basis of failure to allege a substantial and material change in 
circumstances, but that Respondent be given leave to file an amended petition.  The Court 
2
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overrules the objection and finds there is not substantial and material change in circumstances 
not contemplated at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered.  
4. Petitioner’s objection to the March 7, 2017 Recommendation is sustained in part 
and overruled in part.  Commissioner Wilson’s recommendation is modified to remove the 
permission for leave file an amended petition.  The Court finds that the allegations set forth in 
the Petition to Modify amount to an allegation of tort claim and, therefore, the divorce action is 
not the proper forum to litigate a tort claim.  The Court finds the Commissioner abused her 
discretion by granting leave of court to amend the Respondent's Verified Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce.  All other portions of Petitioner’s objection to the March 7, 2017 
Recommendation are overruled.  
 5. The Court does not address the arguments raised by Petitioner as to the 
constitutionality of the relief requested by Respondent to restrict the speech of Petitioner.  
6. This case is DISMISSED.  This is the final order of the Court and no further 
order is required.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THIS ORDER IS ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE ON THE
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